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This study examined how prior expectancies affect young and older adults' 
contingency judgments. Participants completed contingency problems representing all 
combinations of expectancy (positive, negative, unrelated, and unknown) and 
contingency (positive, negative, and zero). I originally predicted that the largest age 
differences would emerge when both the expectancy and the contingency were strong and 
incongruent, regardless of the nature of the expectancy. However, age differences in the 
effect of expectancy were strongest when the expectancy was positive and the 
contingency was incongruent, and older adults' judgments were more biased by this 
expectancy. Likewise, I predicted that there would be no age differences when the 
expectancy and the contingency were congruent, but young adults showed a greater 
confirmation effect than older adults when the expectancy was negative. The results may 
not have matched the predictions because they were based on the assumption that all 
types of expectancies would affect judgments in the same way. The findings of the 
current study suggest that this is not the case. Future research is needed to explain why 
certain types of expectancies affect young and older adults' contingency judgment 
differently. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
The focus of this study is on the effect that prior expectancies have on the 
judgment processes of young and older adults. In particular, do older adults rely on 
expectancies more than younger adults when making contingency judgments? There has 
been very little research on this issue to date. However, research on the influences of 
schemas in memory and judgment is directly related to the question of how expectancies 
might influence older adults' contingency judgment. 
An expectancy is a schema or cluster of knowledge on a given topic that aids in 
interpreting, storing, and retrieving information. People rely on schemas in memory at 
encoding and retrieval. "What schemas do is enable the perceiver to identify stimuli 
quickly, 'chunk' an appropriate unit, fill in information missing from the stimulus 
configuration, and select a strategy for obtaining further information, solving a problem, 
or reaching a goal" (Taylor & Crocker, 1981, p. 93). According to schema theory, we 
make sense of the world around us in relation to past experiences, which aids in 
perception, learning, and retrieval of new information. Likewise, schemas are used in 
making social judgments. When a cognitive representation of a target person is activated, 
judgments about this person will be based on the perceiver's schema and not on the 
current stimulus information (Hamilton, 1981). Schemas and expectancies also affect 
contingency judgments, which are assessments of the degree to which two events co-
vary. Covariation can be defined by how events co-occur, or the degree to which one 
event occurs more often in the presence than the absence of another event (Alloy & 
Tabachnik, 1984). 
To explain how expectancies affect contingency judgments, Alloy and Tabachnik 
(1984) created an interactional theoretical framework that could be used to explain 
contingency detection. The framework assumes that people acquire knowledge of event 
contingencies based on situational information and that these cognitive representations 
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interact with prior expectancies to influence contingency judgment (Goddard & Allan, 
1988). For example, when the expectancy and the current situational information are 
congruent but are weak, the person making the judgment will either refrain from making 
any judgment or will do so with very little confidence. On the other hand, when the 
expectancy is strong and the current situational information is weak, the judgment will be 
made according to the person's expectancy. Likewise, if the expectancy is weak and the 
current situational information is strong, the judgment will reflect the situational 
information. When both the expectancy and the current situational information are 
strong, then one of two things could happen. First, if the two sources of information 
match or are congruent, the judgment will be consistent with this information. Secondly, 
if the expectancy and the current situational information are both strong, but do not match 
or are incongruent, the individual is faced with a cognitive dilemma and the judgment 
will be based on the relative strength of the two sources of information. 
However, pre-existing beliefs or expectancies can distort contingency judgments. 
A key example of expectancy overshadowing situational information to bias judgment is 
illusory correlation. An illusory correlation is a systematic error in which a person 
believes that two events are related when in fact they may not be related, may be related 
to a lesser degree than believed, or may be related in the opposite direction (Chapman & 
Chapman, 1967). Research on expectancy-based illusory correlation illustrates the 
robustness of expectancies and the resistance of prior beliefs to change in the face of 
conflicting situational information (Chapman & Chapman,1967; Golding & Rorer,1972; 
Spears, Eiser, & Van Der Plight, 1987). 
The literature on expectancies and judgments in older adults is sparse, but a large 
body of age-related research on schematic influences on memory and judgment is directly 
related to expectancies and judgment. Hess (1990) concluded that the supportive 
functions of schemas are clearly more important in determining memory performance in 
older adults compared to young adults. Likewise, in social judgment, Hess and Follett 
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(1994) showed that older adults relied more on schematic factors in making behavior 
prediction judgments, although young adults' judgments reflected the current situational 
information. Also, it has been shown that older adults are more likely to make social 
judgments consistent with their expectancies even after they have been presented with 
additional expectancy inconsistent information (Hess & Pullen, 1994; Hess, Vandermaas, 
Donley, & Snyder, 1987). 
In a similar vein, Mutter and Pliske (1994) found that both young and older adults 
were just as likely to make illusory correlations. However, when presented with evidence 
disconfirming their expectancies, young adults modified their judgments thereby 
reducing the illusory correlation, but older adults' judgments stayed the same. Likewise, 
older adults' memory for expectancy confirming evidence was more accurate than their 
memory for disconfirming evidence, but young adults' memory for these two types of 
evidence showed no differences. 
These findings lead us to believe that the influence of expectancies on judgment 
may vary as a function of age. However, Mutter and Pliske's (1994) study on illusory 
correlation and aging only examined judgments when both the expectancy and situational 
information were strong and incongruent and when the expectancy was strong but the 
situational information was weak. Thus, it is unknown whether these age-related 
differences will disappear when situational information and expectancy are both strong 
and congruent, or when the expectancy is weak but the situational information is strong. 
Therefore the current study examined all possible expectancy and current information 
interactions proposed in the framework by Alloy and Tabachnik (1984). 
The most prominent difference between young and older adults' judgments was 
expected to occur when both prior expectancy and situational information were strong 
and incongruent. In contrast, age-related differences should disappear when both the 
expectancy and situational information are strong and congruent. Similarly, no age-
related differences were expected when the expectancy was strong but the situational 
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information was weak. In all the interactions of situational information and prior 
expectancy, young adults were expected to be more accurate in their judgments when 
compared to older adults (Mutter & Pliske, 1996). 
Chapter 2 
Review of Literature 
The influence of schemas on cognition has been studied in a vast array of contexts 
and academic domains for nearly a century. A schema is a cluster of knowledge on a 
given topic that aides interpretation, storage, and retrieval of information. Hastie (1981) 
concluded that the term schema is analogous to expectations, abstract hypotheses, 
prototypes, organizing principles, frames, scripts, plans, or any other term used to 
describe abstract mental organizing systems or memory structures. Thus, for the 
remainder of this paper the terms prior expectancy, expectancy, and schema will be used 
interchangeably. 
Frederick Bartlett was a pioneer in research on schemas, and his theory underlies 
most experiments on how these memory representations influence cognition. Bartlett 
(1932) referred to a schema as an active organization of past reactions or experiences that 
operate to form a new response. He stated that behavior seems to be dominated by past 
events placed into memory in relation to new associated events. According to schema 
theory, we make sense of the world around us in relation to past experiences which aide 
in perception, learning, and retrieval of new information. When presented with a new 
event that shares attributes of a schema stored in memory, we perceive the new 
experiences in terms of the schema and react based on our past experiences. According 
to Bartlett, interpretation by schemata is the primary way we are influenced by past 
reactions and experiences. 
One of the main contributions of Bartlett's (1932) concept of schemas in memory 
was his emphasis on both accurate and inaccurate reproductions in narrative recall 
(Hastie, 1981). For example, in Bartlett's experiments on repeated reproduction, 
participants5 schemas led to inaccurate recall of story information. Participants first read 
a folk story and were asked twenty hours later to recall the story verbatim. They 
frequently remembered only the main structure, simplified events, and transformed the 
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story into familiar detail. For example, in the story The War of the Ghosts, participants 
often replaced the word 'canoe' with 'boat' transforming the story into language more 
commonly used by the individuals in the participant pool. Bartlett noted that these 
transformations or individual adaptations of detail were remembered more often and 
given more emphasis than the actual content of the story. By adapting the folk story to fit 
a pre-existing schema, the transformations facilitated remembering. In addition, these 
alterations to memory were more prevalent when the retention interval was long. 
According to schema theory, these findings are not surprising. The transformation of 
material into familiar detail exemplifies one way that prior knowledge interferes with 
new information. 
Sulin and Dooling (1974) extended Bartlett's studies to test the influence of 
schemas or prior knowledge in the retention of prose. They manipulated the intrusion of 
prior schematic knowledge by having participants read short paragraphs detailing the life 
of either a famous (Helen Keller or Adolph Hitler) or fictitious (Carol Harris or Gerald 
Martin) main character. Half the participants were given a recognition test after a five-
minute retention interval and the other half were given the test one week later. In the first 
experiment, the recognition test consisted of seven sentences from the original paragraph 
and one foil sentence that had either a high or low thematic relation to the original 
context. Participants were asked to judge whether these sentences were exactly the same, 
slightly different, or very different from the original story and to give a confidence rating 
for their judgment. Both recognition accuracy and confidence were combined to create a 
total score such that the higher the accuracy and confidence the higher the total score. 
Inaccurate recognition responses matched with high confidence were given the lowest 
possible total score. Overall, total scores were higher after a short retention interval than 
after a longer retention interval, and in both conditions participants were more likely to 
falsely recognize the high-thematic foil sentence when the main character was famous. 
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The greater occurrence of false positive recognition errors confirmed Bartlett's (1932) 
theory that people rely on pre-existing knowledge in memory (Sulin & Dooling, 1974). 
In Sulin and Dooling's (1974) second experiment, the procedure was the same as 
before but the recognition test was altered to manipulate the degree of semantic 
relatedness in schematic intrusions. This recognition test consisted of seven of the 
original sentences and seven new sentences (the foil used in the previous experiment, one 
medium and one low thematically-related foil, and four neutral foils). The medium and 
the low thematically-related foils were added to reduce any novelty associated with the 
foil used in the previous experiment and to represent different degrees of semantic 
relatedness to the schema. Participants were asked to give a yes-no recognition judgment 
for all 14 sentences. Participants with the famous main character had a greater tendency 
to falsely recognize the high-thematic foil sentence, and this effect was more prominent 
in the one-week retention interval confirming Bartlett's (1932) observation that thematic 
influence increases with the passage of time. 
Dooling and Christiaansen (1977) subsequently investigated the point at which 
schemas are most likely to interfere with remembering. In particular, they manipulated 
when they disclosed that the main character was famous. Participants were told either 
before, immediately after, or a week after reading the passage that the main character was 
either Helen Keller or Adolph Hitler. A recognition test was given after a one-week 
retention interval to all participants. Those who were told immediately after reading the 
passage made the most false recognition errors regardless of thematic relatedness. Thus, 
the immediately-after group had more difficulty differentiating between the passage they 
had just read and their schema for the passage content during the recognition task. 
Likewise, a significant difference in the number of false positive errors between the 
immediately-after and week-after groups in thematic performance demonstrated that 
directly after the initial comprehension of the passage was when constructive memory 
retrieval processing was most susceptible to schematic intrusions. 
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Social Judgment 
It is clear that people rely on schemas in memory. Schemas are also used in 
making judgments. The influence of expectancies in judgment has been studied 
predominately in social judgment. Social judgment research focuses on judgments about 
people, social events, and social roles. When prior knowledge about a person, group, or 
event exists, then judgments are more likely to be made according to this knowledge than 
current situational information (Wyer & Carlston, 1994). In terms of schema theory, 
when a cognitive representation of a target person is activated, judgments about this 
person will be based on the perceiver's schema and not on the current situational 
information (Hamilton, 1981). 
Stereotypes are one of the most studied forms of social schemas. A stereotype is 
a mental representation of an attribute or value believed to be representative of all 
members of a social group. Stereotypes act as expectancies that guide the processing of 
information about social groups and their members. Stereotypes can be formed directly 
through first hand experience or indirectly through societal impressions. Through these 
experiences and impressions, a person first develops beliefs about the attributes or 
characteristics of the target group and then, based on these beliefs, distinguishes the 
target group and its members from other groups (Hamilton & Sherman, 1994). 
Stereotypes do not have to be consciously activated to influence judgments, but 
can be automatically activated and used to aid impression formation of target group 
members. A series of studies by Kunda, Davies, Adams, and Spencer (2002) showed that 
stereotypes are automatically activated by mere exposure to a target group member, but 
this activation quickly dissipates and the stereotype is not reactivated or explicitly applied 
unless the target member and the perceiver are in disagreement of opinion. For example, 
when Caucasian participants were exposed to an African American target, there was a 
greater activation for stereotypic words in a lexical decision task than when the 
participants were shown a target of the same race. Yet participants did not explicitly 
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apply the stereotype when evaluating the target in a trait characteristic checklist even 
when the target individual had prompted the stereotype activation. 
To see if participants would implicitly apply the stereotype to the target 
individual, Kunda et al. (2002) followed the same procedure as before but added a 
predictive judgment task. The logic of the predictive judgment task is as follows. If 
Caucasian participants observed a target of the same race with disagreeing opinions, they 
would use this new information when predicting the opinion of a new target of the same 
race. However, if Caucasian participants observed a target of a different race with 
disagreeing opinions, they would dismiss this target's reaction because of his or her 
ethnicity and regard the new information as irrelevant when predicting the opinion of a 
new Caucasian target. The predictive judgment task revealed that Caucasian participants' 
impressions of the African American target were in fact formed by his or her ethnicity, 
even though the explicit measures did not detect any stereotype application (Kunda et al., 
2002). 
Stereotypes can be helpful cognitive tools for quickly perceiving individuals, 
making social judgments, and recalling social information (Bodenhausen & Wyer, 1985; 
Sherman, 1996) but excessive reliance on stereotypes can have many negative 
consequences. For instance, initial impressions are not always correct, stereotypes are 
usually not validated, and prejudices and biases may emerge leading to misperceptions on 
the part of both the target member and the perceiver. Bartlett (1932) said that for 
schemas to be useful, "man must be able to turn round upon his own schemata- for he 
learns how to utilize the constituents of his own schemes, instead of being determined to 
action by the schemes themselves, functioning as unbroken units," (p. 301). Stereotypes 
should be used in the same way, as an interpretive guide not as a determinating factor. 
However research shows that this usage rarely occurs. 
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Contingency Judgment 
Schemas and expectancies also affect contingency judgments, which are 
assessments of the degree to which two events co-vary. In much of the research on 
contingency judgment, the terms covariation and co-occurrence are interchangeable. Co-
occurrence refers to the degree that one event occurs more often in the presence than the 
absence of another event which, in turn, can be used to define how the events covary 
(Alloy & Tabachnik, 1984). A contingency can be positive (the occurrence of one event 
indicates that the second event will occur), negative (the occurrence of one event 
indicates that the second event will not occur), or zero (the occurrence of one event is 
unrelated to the occurrence of the second event). The strength of the contingency is 
determined by how close the contingency is to the absolute value of one; that is, a perfect 
positive contingency would be 1.0, a perfect negative contingency would be -1.0, and the 
absence of a contingency would be zero. The contingency between two events is 
determined by the frequencies of event co-occurrences in a 2 x 2 contingency table. 
Figure 1 is an example of a contingency table in which cell A represents the number of 
times both the cue and the outcome occurred, cell B represents the number of times the 
cue occurred but the outcome was absent, cell C represents the number of times the cue 
was absent but the outcome occurred, and cell D represents the number of times both the 
cue and outcome were absent (see Appendix A for more examples of contingency tables). 
The actual contingency can be found by using the following formula: (A/ A+B) - (C/ 
C+D) or AP=P(cue/outcome)-P(cue/no outcome). 
Outcome 
Cue 
C 
~C 
Figure 1. Example of a 2 x 2 contingency table. 
O ~0 
A B 
C D 
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Alloy and Tabachnik (1984) created an interactional theoretical framework to 
explain how prior expectancies affect contingency judgments. According to Alloy and 
Tabachnik's model, one of five things may occur when a person is required to make a 
judgment for which he or she has some pre-existing belief or prior expectancy. If both 
the expectancy and the current situational information are weak, the person making the 
judgment will either abstain from making any assessment of covariation or will do so 
with very little confidence. When the expectancy is strong and the current situational 
information is weak, the judgment will be made in line with the person's expectancy. 
Likewise, if the expectancy is weak and the current situational information is strong, the 
judgment will reflect the situational information. However, when the expectancy and the 
current situational information are both strong, one of two things could happen. First, if 
the two sources of information match or are congruent, the judgment made will be 
consistent with this information and will be made with high confidence. In contrast, 
when the expectancy and the current situational information do not match or are 
incongruent, the individual is faced with a cognitive dilemma. When this occurs the 
individual's judgment will be based on the comparative strengths of the conflicting 
information sources. For example, if the person's expectancy is strong, but he or she 
does not feel that the incongruent current situational information comes from a reliable 
source, the judgment will be made in line with the expectancy. Whereas, if the person 
believes that the current source of information is more reliable than the expectancy, the 
judgment will be made in accordance to the current situational information. The relative 
strength of both the expectancy and the current situational information interact in the 
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same way, whether the actual contingency is positive, negative, or zero (Alloy & 
Tabachnik, 1984). 
This model implies that when a person is faced with a cognitive dilemma, the 
individual will often try to resolve this dilemma by making the judgment in the direction 
of his or her prior expectancies. In this way, contingency assessments can be distorted 
based on pre-existing beliefs or expectancies. A key example of expectancy-based 
distortions in contingency judgment is a bias known as illusory correlation. Specifically, 
illusory correlation is a systematic error in which a person judges two events to be related 
when in fact they may not be related, may be related to a lesser degree than believed, or 
may be related in the opposite direction (Chapman & Chapman, 1967). 
Chapman and Chapman (1967) conducted several studies of illusory correlation 
after they observed that clinicians continued to maintain the belief that certain symptoms 
were related to performance on the Draw-a-Person Test even when research had failed to 
substantiate these beliefs. For instance, clinicians would often conclude that a drawing 
depicting a person with a small head implied low intelligence or a picture with enlarged 
eyes indicated paranoia even when empirical data did not support these associations. To 
see if untrained individuals would make the same erroneous judgments, Chapman and 
Chapman asked college students' to review the Draw-a-Person Test under various 
conditions. They found that illusory correlation persisted even after repeated exposure to 
stimulus materials under conditions designed to maximize motivation, and the stability of 
the illusory correlation seemed to be consistent for both clinicians and college students. 
Starr and Katkin (1969) also observed that both untrained individuals and clinicians 
showed an illusory correlation bias on the Rotter Incomplete Sentence Blank. 
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Golding and Rorer (1972) conducted an illusory correlation study similar to 
Chapman and Chapman (1967) except they used Rorschach cards in order to examine the 
illusory correlation for the associations of homosexual behavior with anal response. The 
illusory correlation bias was measured both before and after training in which no 
relationship between homosexual behavior and anal response existed. The training 
sessions varied based on the manipulation of simultaneous or prediction feedback, the 
inclusion of all possible event pair contingencies, and varying the direction and 
magnitude of the actual contingencies based on the symptom base-rate presentation. The 
experimenters predicted that the illusory correlation between homosexual behavior and 
anal response would disappear or be reduced after training with predictive feedback, 
when different behavior-response pairs had a stronger contingency than the expected pair, 
and when the base rates were equal for the occurrence of all symptoms. Although, the 
illusory correlation was reduced, it did not significantly change between pre- and post-
training in any condition. Golding and Rorer concluded that even though participants 
slightly revised their judgments post training, the illusory correlation was still present and 
relatively resistant to change. 
Although much of the early research on illusory correlation focused on projective 
tests, illusory correlations have also been linked to stereotypic judgments. When an 
illusory correlation is based on negatively valued traits, it is usually referred to as a 
prejudice; when an illusory correlation is based on positively valued social traits, it is 
referred to as the halo effect (Chapman, 1967). For example, Spears, Eiser, and Van Der 
Plight (1987) showed the stereotypic belief that smaller towns would be more opposed to 
nuclear power than larger towns biased a perceiver's judgments about the relationship 
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between town size and nuclear power when no actual relationship between these 
variables existed. They concluded that expectation-based illusory correlation biases in 
judgment reveal the resistance of prior beliefs to change in the face of actual conflicting 
data. 
Aging and Expectancy 
The research reviewed in the previous sections has focused on the influence of 
schemas and prior expectancies in the memory and judgment processes of young adults. 
There is also a large body of research on the influence of schematic knowledge in older 
adults' cognition. 
In a review of schematic influences on the memory of older adults, Hess (1990) 
concluded that the supportive functions of schemas are more important in determining 
memory performance in older adults compared to young adults. More specifically, the 
performance differences between young and older adults' memory are particularly 
pronounced in situations that rely on data-driven processing for current situational 
information and minimal in situations that depend more on schema driven processing 
(Hess, 1990). For example, in Hess and Slaughter's (1990) studies on the influence of 
schemas in memory for scenes, older adults' accuracy for to-be-remembered items was 
more dependent on available schematic structure than that of young adults. 
Yet, not all studies agree with Hess's (1990) conclusions that schemas impact 
older adults' memory more than that of young adults. Light and Anderson (1983) found 
no age-related differences in reliance on scripts in memory. Scripts are schemas for 
ordinary sequential steps taken in common activities. They tested both young and older 
adults to see if there would be discrepancies in memory for typical scripted activities. 
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Although older adults' memory in general was poorer than young adults, older adults had 
little difficulty integrating this new information with prior knowledge. 
Hess (1985) attributed the differences between his studies on aging and schema 
reliance and the findings of Light and Anderson (1983) to the low reliability of the 
memory measure used in the Light and Anderson study and to the fact that the older 
population used in the study was highly educated. In addition, the new information used 
in the Light and Anderson study matched the expectancy held by both young and older 
adults. Thus, the Light and Anderson results can be generalized only to situations in 
which expectancy and current situational information are congruent. 
Older adults also show a greater dependence on schemas to make social 
judgments. Hess and Follett (1994) examined the effects of aging on social judgments 
concerning the reliance on new information versus schematic information. Participants 
read a short vignette about a fictitious person. They then were shown a series of traits 
that were used by others to describe the fictitious person and afterwards were asked to 
give frequency estimates of the traits that they had just observed. Finally, they were 
asked to rate the likelihood that the person would perform certain trait consistent or 
inconsistent behaviors and to give a character judgment of the person. They found that 
both young and older adults relied on previously activated schematic information when 
making character judgments. Likewise, no age-related differences or schema-related 
intrusion effects were found for memory recall of frequency estimates of trait 
presentations. However, when participants were asked to make behavior predictions 
based on the previously viewed trait information, older adults relied more on schematic 
factors and younger adults relied on the actual frequency of the current information. 
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The interesting aspect of Hess and Follett's (1994) study is that age differences in 
recall of the situational information and the influence of schemas on recall were almost 
nonexistent, but older adults inevitably based their judgments on schematic information. 
Older adults could accurately remember the frequencies of the trait information presented 
but apparently did not use this information when making judgments. Other studies have 
shown that older adults are more likely to make social judgments consistent with their 
expectancies even after they have been presented with additional inconsistent information 
(Hess & Pullen, 1994; Hess, et al., 1987). Hess (1994) concluded that an age-related 
decline in cognitive ability (e.g., encoding operations, cognitive resources, situational 
constraints, and inhibition processes) limits the information used in judgment to that 
which is easily accessed in memory. 
Aging and Contingency Judgment 
If Hess's (1990) conclusion that older adults rely more on schematic knowledge 
in memory and social judgments is correct, older adults should also be more susceptible 
to illusory correlation in contingency judgment. This is in fact what Mutter and Pliske 
(1994) found when they compared young and older adults' judgment performance in an 
illusory correlation study similar to those of Chapman and Chapman (1967) and Golding 
and Rorer (1972). They matched four behaviors (homosexual, paranoid, inferiority 
feelings, or depression) with four Rorschach card responses (monstrous, food, anal, or 
geography). In baseline co-occurrence judgments both young and older adults judged 
that homosexual behavior and anal responses were related. Participants were then shown 
a series of event pairs in which the homosexual-anal behavior-response pair was not 
correlated (Exp. 1) or a series of event pairs in which this behavior was related to a 
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different response (Exp. 2). Both young and older adults' judgments after the event pair 
presentation showed an illusory correlation existed, illustrating the robustness of the 
illusory correlation bias in the face of disconfirming situational information. However, 
when the target-behavior was paired with an unexpected-response and presented as 
having a salient contingency, young adults modified their judgment reducing the illusory 
correlation while older adults' judgments showed less change (Exp. 2). In addition, older 
adults' memory for expectancy confirming evidence (i.e., homosexual behavior and anal 
response) was more accurate than their memory for disconfirming evidence (i.e., 
homosexual behavior and monstrous response), but young adults showed no differences 
in memory. Thus it seems that older adults are more inclined to illusory correlation 
biases and are less likely to revise their judgments in the face of disconfirming 
information regardless of the salience of the new evidence (Mutter & Pliske, 1994). 
Current Study 
Mutter and Pliske's (1994) findings suggest older adults may rely on prior 
expectancies more than young adults when making judgments and may be less likely to 
adjust their judgments based on current situational information. However, their study of 
aging and illusory correlation only examined differences in young and older adults' 
judgments under conditions of cognitive dilemmas, or when prior expectancy and 
situational information conflict, and when the expectancy was strong and the current 
situational information was weak. To date, it is unknown how aging will affect judgment 
in conditions in which both expectancy and current situational information are weak, 
when both expectancy and current situational information are strong, or when expectancy 
is weak but current situational information is strong. The purpose of the current study 
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therefore was to examine age differences in contingency judgment for all possible 
expectancy and current information interactions proposed in the framework by Alloy and 
Tabachnik (1984). 
Two studies with young adults have looked at some of these interactions. Trolier 
and Hamilton (1986) tested young adults' judgment accuracy when the form of stimulus 
information, the actual contingency, and the prior expectancy of contingency were 
manipulated. The stimulus information or event pairs to be judged were either in 
continuous form (continuous condition), binary or categorical form (binary condition), or 
in continuous form but treated as categorical (mixed condition). The actual contingency 
of the event pairs was either highly positive (0.73) or near zero (0.06). Three expectancy 
conditions were manipulated using event pairs expected to be highly related and 
meaningful (i.e., height and weight), unrelated and meaningful (i.e., age and size of 
residing town), or abstract and having no prior expectancy (i.e., pairs of two- or three-
digit numbers). To ensure that the expectancy of the meaningful event pairs was 
universally perceived as related in the appropriate direction, 18 event pairs were piloted. 
An independent sample of young adults was asked to give estimates of contingency for 
the event pairs on a scale ranging from positive 1.00 to negative 1.00 and to rate their 
confidence of these estimates on a 10-point scale. The event pairs were selected for use 
based on achievement of the appropriate median expected contingency and 
accompanying high confidence ratings. 
For their experiment, participants were given brief instructions on the general 
nature of contingencies and were then shown a series of sentences containing information 
on the correlation between the events pairs. After viewing this information, participants 
19 
were asked to give a direct estimate of contingency, frequency estimates for each event 
pair in the 2 x 2 contingency table, and a confidence rating of their estimates. The 
participants' frequency estimates were placed in a 2 x 2 contingency table, a phi 
coefficient was calculated and transformed into a Fisher's Z score, and the resulting value 
was used as a derived estimate of contingency. Direct and derived measures of estimated 
contingency were used in order to compare each measure's sensitivity to the effects of 
expectancy and current situational information on judgment. 
As might be expected, direct and derived measures of contingency were 
significantly higher for pairs expected to be related than for pairs not expected to be 
related and were lowest for problems that had no associated prior expectancy (Trolier & 
Hamilton, 1986). Likewise, if an expectancy was present, participants rated their 
estimates on those problems with more confidence. In addition, when current situational 
information and expectancy were incongruent, participants were more likely to rate the 
event pairs as related than in cases where no expectancy existed. Clearly judgments were 
affected by expectancy. However, Trolier and Hamilton did not look at negative 
expectancies and negative contingency. Also, in the "don't know" expectancy condition, 
the variables were not meaningful and thus could not be directly compared to the other 
expectancy conditions. 
These problems were eliminated in a study by Billman, Bornstein, and Richards 
(1992) by combining positive, negative, unrelated, and unknown expectancies of 
meaningful event pairs with actual positive, negative, and zero contingency. They used 
piloting procedures similar to those of Trolier and Hamilton (1986) to ensure that 
participants commonly held the co-occurrence expectancies of the event pairs chosen. 
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They then arranged these event pairs in such a way that 15 observations of the event pairs 
represented either a positive 0.50, negative 0.50, or zero contingency. Participants first 
gave a baseline estimate of contingency to confirm that they held the expectancy in the 
direction intended by the experimenters. Then the event pair co-occurrences were shown 
in two different data sets, one data set always represented a 0.00 contingency and was 
paired with a data set with either a -0.50 or 0.50 contingency. After the participants were 
shown the two data sets they were asked half of the time to give a contingency estimate 
for each data set and for the other half of the time were asked to choose which of the two 
data sets showed a stronger contingency. 
Overall, the results were similar to past studies in that the nature of the prior belief 
altered the participants' assessment of the current situational information in the expected 
direction. For example, participants judged the events as being more positively related 
when the expectancy was positive and more negatively related when the expectancy was 
negative, relative to the judgments in the unrelated or unknown expectancy (Billman et 
al., 1992). The most biasing expectancy was a belief that the events were unrelated, 
because it attenuated all estimates towards zero when the contingency was actually 
positive 0.50 or negative 0.50. Thus, not all expectancies affect judgment in the same 
way; having an unknown expectancy between independently meaningful variables 
provided the most accurate judgments, while the belief in no relation affects covariation 
assessment the most. 
The procedures used in the Trolier and Hamilton (1986) and Billman et al. (1992) 
studies were combined in the current study to examine the effects of prior expectancies 
on young and older adults' contingency judgments. The co-occurring event pairs 
selected for use were presented in the same manner as those in Trolier and Hamilton and 
represented either a negative 0.50, a zero, or a positive 0.50 contingency. As in Billman 
et al., four different expectancy types (positive, negative, unrelated, and unknown) and 
three different contingencies (negative, zero, and positive) were fully crossed to examine 
age differences in judgment for all combinations of expectancy and situational 
information in Alloy and Tabachnik's (1984) interactional theoretical model. For 
example, strong (belief in positive, negative, or unrelated) and weak (unknown belief) 
expectancies were examined when the current situational information was either strong 
(positive 0.50 or negative 0.50 contingency) or weak (0.00 contingency). 
To measure the interaction of expectancy and current situational information, both 
young and older adults were asked to give an initial baseline contingency estimate for 
each event pair and rate their confidence of this judgment. They were then asked to make 
a second contingency estimate and confidence rating after viewing statements 
representing the four types of event pair combinations in the 2 x 2 contingency table. 
Lastly, the participants were asked to estimate the frequency of occurrence of the event 
pair combinations shown during the statement presentation. The frequency estimates 
were used to calculate a derived estimate of contingency. Derived contingency estimates 
may be more accurate than direct estimates of contingency because derived estimates are 
based on the simpler task of giving frequency estimates. 
In terms of Alloy and Tabachnik's (1984) theoretical framework, the most 
prominent age difference in contingency judgment was expected to occur when both 
expectancy and current situational information were strong and incongruent. As in the 
illusory correlation study by Mutter and Pliske (1994), when faced with a cognitive 
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dilemma, older adults should be more likely to bias their judgments in the direction of 
their expectancy and less likely to revise this judgment when presented with incongruent 
situational information. On the other hand, Mutter and Pliske (1994) found no age-
related differences when the expectancy was strong but the current situational 
information was weak. Age-related differences were predicted to disappear when 
expectancy and situational information were both congruent, as in the Light and 
Anderson (1983) study. Likewise, young and older adults' judgments were not expect to 
differ when the expectancy was weak but the current situational information was strong. 
In all conditions young adults were expected to be more accurate in their judgments when 
compared to older adults (Mutter & Pliske, 1996) 
Chapter 3 
Method 
Participants 
Twenty-four young adults with ages ranging from 18 to 30 years old were 
recruited from psychology classes. Twenty-four older adults, 60 years of age or older, 
were recruited from the community via mass mail-outs and advertisements. The young 
adults received course credit and a gift certificate to the university bookstore for their 
participation. The older adults were paid a monetary stipend for their participation. 
Biographical data (age, race, gender, years of education, and marital status) and cognitive 
ability (verbal knowledge, perceptual speed, and working memory executive functioning) 
data were collected for both age groups as shown in Table 1. As is typical in aging 
research, younger adults showed significantly greater perceptual speed (digit symbol) and 
working memory executive functioning (reading span) than older adults. 
Participants who reported current use of medications known to affect cognitive 
ability or who suffered from any neurological or psychological impairment were 
excluded from the study. As a result, three young adults and two older adults were not 
permitted to complete the study because of reported usage of medications known to affect 
cognitive ability. 
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Table 1. 
Participant Characteristics 
Characteristic Young Adults Older Adults 
Age3 19.21 (1.53) 71.54 (5.32) 
Race 1 African American 
23 Caucasians 
2 African Americans 
22 Caucasians 
Gender 9 males; 15 females 7 males; 17 females 
Education3 13.33 (1.58) 13.63 (3.06) 
Marital Status 23 single; 1 married 16 married; 4 divorced; 
4 widowed 
Vocabulary11 30.04 (6.03) 33.45 (9.41) 
Digit Symbol6*** 88.13 (11.44) 52.48 (11.59) 
Reading Spanb*** 3.04(1.61) 1.61 (0.89) 
Note. Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors. aAge and Education 
represent average years. Vocabulary, Digit Symbol, and Reading Span represent 
average test score. *** p<. 001 
Design and Materials 
A 2 (Age: Young vs. Old) x 4 (Expectancy: Positive vs. Negative vs. Unknown 
vs. Unrelated) x 3 (Contingency: -0.50 vs. 0.00 vs. +0.50) mixed factorial design with 
repeated measures on expectancy and contingency was used. To control for order effects, 
variables were counterbalanced by actual contingency, contingency table data set, 
expectancy, and expectancy context using the randomized Latin-square design shown in 
Appendix B. Two participants from each age group were randomly assigned to each 
counterbalancing order. Participants completed twelve contingency judgment problems 
representing all combinations of expectancy and contingency. 
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Three different event pair contexts for each expectancy and four different data 
sets for each contingency were used because these variables were measured using a 
within-subject design. For each of the three contingency values, four contingency table 
data sets were randomly selected from all possible 2 x 2 contingency tables (with 
marginal outcome totals of 6 and 18, 8 and 16, and 12 and 12). See Appendix A for a list 
of the contingency tables selected for each contingency. 
Event pair contexts for each expectancy were obtained by pilot testing for both 
age groups to determine the direction and magnitude of various event relationships. The 
pilot test procedures were modeled after those used by Trolier and Hamilton (1986). 
Twenty young and 20 older adults were shown 76 different event pairs, which 
experimenters believed represented either a positive, negative, unrelated, or unknown 
expectancy. Some of the event pairs selected were originally used in the study conducted 
by Billman et al. (1992) and the experimenters generated the others. The participants 
were asked to estimate the contingency for the event pairs using a scale ranging from 
+100 to -100. They were also asked to rate their confidence in their estimates on a scale 
ranging from 1 (not very confident) to 10 (very confident). The pairs were then rank 
ordered based on the median estimates of contingency and mean confidence estimates for 
each age group. The top three event pairs for each expectancy were selected. Median 
contingency and mean confidence estimates in both age groups for the pairs selected can 
be seen in Table 2. 
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Table 2. 
Median Contingency Estimates and Mean Confidence Ratings for Event Pairs Selected 
Event Pair Young Adult Young Adult Older Adult Older Adult 
Estimate Confidence Estimate Confidence 
Smoking cigarettes and lung cancer 0.8 
Caloric intake and body weight 0.7 
Number of credit cards and 0.6 
amount of credit debt 
Height and college grade 0.0 
point average 
Number of movies attended 0.0 
and red meat consumption 
Finger length and sexual orientation 0.0 
Percent of body fat and 0.0 
red blood cell count 
Daily calcium intake and average 0.0 
resting pulse 
Silicon content and rock density 0.0 
Anger and compassion -0.4 
Church attendance and -0.5 
prison sentence 
Amount of television watched -0.6 
and number of books read 
8.9 0.8 9.3 
8.5 0.9 9.0 
7.7 0.6 8.3 
8.9 0.0 8.3 
8.0 0.0 8.3 
7.9 0.0 7.5 
6.2 0.0 6.3 
6.1 0.0 6.7 
3.8 0.0 5.4 
7.0 -0.4 7.6 
7.2 -0.3 7.4 
7.6 -0.6 8.0 
Based on the pilot data, it was concluded that both young and older adults hold 
similar expectancies of contingency between the event pairs selected. The positive, 
negative, and unrelated expectancy conditions contained pairs of meaningful variables in 
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which subjects had a specific expectation about the nature of the relationship; the 
unknown expectancy variables were independently meaningful but subjects were 
uncertain about whether the event pairs were related (Billman, Bornstein, & Richards, 
1992). 
Procedure 
Participants were tested individually in two, three-hour sessions, which were 
completed within seven days of each other. All testing was conducted in the Cognition 
Laboratory or similar experimental room. Some tasks were completed on a Macintosh 
computer and some were completed using a pencil and paper. The procedure for young 
and older adults was the same. 
Participants first completed an informed consent form and filled out a 
biographical and health questionnaire. Before any testing began, participants were given 
an opportunity to ask questions or voice concerns. They were then seated in front of the 
computer and asked to read general instructions concerning the nature of contingency and 
how example events were related in strength and direction. Participants then completed 
an example problem followed by the 12 contingency judgment problems. For each 
problem, participants were shown a short vignette introducing the two events to be 
judged. They were asked to give a baseline judgment of the relationship between the 
events using a scale ranging from zero (no relationship) to 100 (perfect relationship) and 
to check the corresponding direction (positive or negative). They then rated the 
confidence of their estimate on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all confident) to 10 (very 
confident). After completing the baseline measures participants were shown 24 
statements, each of which presented one of the four event pair combinations in the 2 x 2 
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contingency table (i.e., XY is a smoker and does have lung cancer; XY is a nonsmoker 
and does have lung cancer; XY is a smoker and does not have lung cancer; or XY is a 
nonsmoker and does not have lung cancer). These statements provided current 
situational information about the co-occurrence of the two events, which were either a 
negative 0.50, a zero, or a positive 0.50 contingency. Statements were presented at the 
rate of one statement every four seconds. 
After viewing all of the statements, participants were required to make a second 
estimate of the event pair relationship and confidence rating using the same scales as 
before. However, it was emphasized that this estimate should be based solely on the 
information provided by the statements that had just been seen. Lastly, they were asked 
to estimate the frequency of occurrence for each of the four event pair combinations seen 
during the statement presentation. 
Once the participants completed the example problem, the experimenter provided 
the correct answers to the example questions and clarified any remaining questions 
concerning the procedure. Participants then completed the 12 contingency judgment 
problems in the order determined by the counterbalancing procedures. For the purpose of 
measuring individual differences, participants were then given additional tasks measuring 
verbal knowledge (Mill Hill Vocabulary Test), perceptual speed [WAIS-III Digit Symbol 
(Wechsler, 1997)], and working memory executive functioning [Reading Span (Salthouse 
& Babcock, 1991)]. After completing the cognitive ability tasks, participants were 
debriefed, given the opportunity to ask questions, and compensated for their time. 
Chapter 4 
Results 
The following dependent measures were collected for all 12 contingency 
problems: baseline estimates of contingency, direct estimates of contingency, confidence 
ratings for both baseline and direct contingency estimates, and frequency estimates for 
each cell in the 2 x 2 contingency table. These frequency estimates were used to compute 
a derived estimate of contingency based on the formula for contingency [AP = P(0/C) -
P(0/~C)]. Factorial analyses of variance (ANOVA) for age, expectancy, and 
contingency were conducted for each dependent measure. All effects reported as 
significant reached a criterion of p < .05 or better, unless otherwise noted. 
Despite the piloting procedures used to ensure that young and older adults' 
baseline expectancies for the contingency problems were the same and that these 
expectancies were in the direction intended by the experimenters, 10.4% of the reported 
baseline estimates of contingency across both age groups did not follow the direction 
intended by the experimenters. However, young (4% positive, 8% negative, 15%, 
unrelated, and 17% unknown) and older (3% positive, 10% negative, 10%, unrelated, and 
17% unknown) adults' baseline estimates were similarly miscategorized for each 
expectancy. Moreover, no single event pair stood out as being miscategorized more than 
any of the others. The miscategorized baseline estimates were lower in these data than 
reported by Billman, Bornstein, and Richards (1992), who found that 31% of their 
participants' overall baseline estimates differed from the direction intended. They 
handled this discrepancy by recoding the participants' baseline estimate of contingency to 
match their expectancy. I also recoded the data so that the participants' reported 
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expectancy corresponded with the expectancy condition. Specifically, any baseline 
estimates deviating from the following criteria were recoded: positive expectancy - event 
pairs with an estimated contingency greater than zero; negative expectancy - event pairs 
with an estimated contingency less than or equal to 0.30; unrelated expectancy - event 
pairs with an estimated contingency between -0.20 and +0.20; and unknown expectancy 
- event pairs with an estimated contingency at or between -0.50 and +0.50. By recoding 
the data I, in turn, had to change the design from a mixed factorial design with repeated 
measures on expectancy and contingency to a between subjects design for age, 
expectancy, and contingency to avoid having to drop a large part of the data. 
Baseline Estimates of Contingency and Confidence Ratings 
Mean baseline contingency estimates and confidence ratings can be seen in Table 
3 for each of the four expectancy conditions: positive, negative, unrelated, and unknown. 
A 2(Age) x 4(Expectancy) x 3 (Contingency) ANOVA for the baseline estimates was 
conducted to determine if, after recoding, these estimates were in the direction of the 
expectancy and to assure that these estimates were not different for young and older 
adults. There was a main effect of expectancy, F(3, 552) = 742.968, MSE = .053, r|2 = 
.802, indicating that the type of expectancy affected baseline estimates of contingency. 
The main effects of age, F(l, 552) = .437, r|2 = .001, and contingency, F(2, 552) = .689, 
T| = .002, were not significant, nor were the interactions between age and expectancy, 
F(3, 552) = .783, i f = .004, age and contingency, F(2, 552) = .583, r\2 = .002, 
expectancy and contingency, F(6, 552) = .1.268, r|2 = .014, and age, expectancy, and 
contingency, F(6, 552) = .756, r|2 = .008. 
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To explore the impact of expectancy on the baseline estimates, planned 
comparisons were conducted for each of the following expectancy combinations: 
positive vs. unknown, negative vs. unknown, and unrelated vs. unknown. These analyses 
revealed that overall contingency estimates were significantly greater when the 
expectancy was positive (M= .731 ,SE = .002) than estimates when the expectancy was 
unknown (M= -.002, SE = .003), F{\, 552) = 698.301, MSE = .053. Overall estimates 
were significantly lower when the expectancy was negative (M= -.461, SE = .004) than 
estimates when the expectancy was unknown, F( 1, 552) = 284.019, MSE = .053. 
However, overall estimates were not different when the expectancy was unrelated (M= 
0.00, SE = .000) than estimates when the expectancy was unknown, F( 1, 552) = 0.091, 
MSE= .053. 
As expected, both young and older adults' baseline estimates were higher when 
the expectancy was positive, lowest when the expectancy was negative, and close to zero 
when the expectancy was unrelated or unknown. There was little or no difference 
between the baseline estimates of contingency of young and older adults. Thus, young 
and older adults had similar expectancies, and this outcome was the same across 
contingency. Likewise, the baseline mean estimate for each expectancy was very close to 
the pilot data mean estimate for each expectancy. 
A 2(Age) x 4(Expectancy) x 3 (Contingency) factorial ANOVA was conducted for 
the confidence ratings for baseline contingency estimates. The main effect of age was 
significant, F( 1, 552) = 45.303, MSE = 6.086, r|2 = .076, revealing that older adults' (M= 
7.188, SE = .172) baseline confidence ratings were significantly higher than young 
adults' ratings (M= 5.774, SE = .137). There was also a main effect of expectancy, F(3, 
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552) = 31.016, r)2 = .144, and post hoc analyses, collapsed across and contingency, 
showed that when the expectancy was positive (M= 8.154, SE = .225) confidence ratings 
were significantly higher than ratings when the expectancies were negative (M= 7.200, 
SE= .300) and unknown (M= 5.458, SE = .432) but were similar to ratings when the 
expectancy was unrelated (M= 7.474, SE - .388); ratings for negative expectancies were 
significantly higher than ratings for unknown expectancies but were similar to ratings for 
unrelated expectancies; and ratings for unrelated expectancies were significantly higher 
than ratings for unknown expectancies (Tukey's HSD, p< 05). As expected, the main 
effect of contingency was not significant, F(2, 552) = 1.647, r|2 = .00, nor were the 
interactions between age and expectancy, F(3, 552) = .236, r|2 = .001, age and 
contingency, F(2, 552) = .661, T|2 = .002, expectancy and contingency, F(6, 552) = 1.238, 
r| = .013, and age, expectancy, and contingency, F(6, 552) = .134, r| =.001. Thus, 
older adults were generally more confident than young adults, and neither group was very 
confident in their estimates when they did not know the relationship. 
Table 3. 
Mean Baseline Estimates of Contingency and Confidence Ratings 
Expectancy Young Adults 
Estimate 
Young Adults 
Confidence 
Older Adults 
Estimate 
Older Adults 
Confidence 
Positive .691 (.021) 6.66 (.193) .731 (.021) 8.15 (.225) 
Negative -.494 (.033) 5.66 (.234) -.461 (.044) 7.20 (.300) 
Unrelated .000 (.007) 6.40 (.330) -.000 (.002) 7.47 (.388) 
Unknown .008 (.031) 3.97 (.258) -.024 (.027) 5.46 (.432) 
*Note. Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors. 
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Direct Estimates of Contingency and Confidence Ratings 
A 2(Age) x 4(Expectancy) x 3(Contingency) factorial ANOVA was conducted for 
the direct estimates of contingency. These data can be seen in Figure 2. There were 
significant main effects of: age, F( 1, 552) = 11.583, MSE = .20, r\2 - .021, showing that 
overall older adults' estimates were greater than young adults' estimates; expectancy, 
F(3, 552) = 34.747, r|2 = .159, indicating that the type of expectancy affected estimates 
differently; and contingency, F(2, 552) = 51.951, rj2 = .158, showing that estimates 
varied by contingency. The interaction between expectancy and contingency was not 
significant, F(6, 552) = .935, r\2 = .010, but there were significant two-way interactions 
between age and expectancy, F(3, 552) = 5.295, r\2 = .028, and age and contingency, F(2, 
552) = 4.733, T]2 = .017, showing that the effects of expectancy and contingency on direct 
estimates varied for young and older adults. Moreover, these two-way interactions were 
qualified by a significant three-way interaction between age, expectancy, and 
contingency, F(6, 552) = 2.090, r|2 = .022. 
To allow me to compare my findings with Billman et al. (1992), I first analyzed 
this three-way interaction by examining the simple interaction of expectancy and 
contingency for each age group (Keppel, 1991). For young adults, the main effects of 
expectancy, F(3, 552) = 9.485, MSE= .20, and contingency, F(2, 552) = 43.435, were 
significant. Polynomial contrast revealed that there was a significant linear trend of 
contingency, such that estimates were lowest when the contingency was negative (M= -
.3057, SE = .004), closer to zero when the contingency was zero (M= .106, SE = .005), 
and highest when the contingency was positive (M= .327, SE = .005). There was also a 
significant interaction between expectancy and contingency, F(6, 552) = 2.635. 
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To explore the impact of expectancy on young adults' estimates of contingency, 
interaction contrasts were conducted for each of the following expectancy combinations: 
positive vs. unknown, negative vs. unknown, and unrelated vs. unknown. When the 
expectancy was positive, there were significant main effects of expectancy, F( 1, 552) = 
11.64, MSE = 0.20, and contingency, F(2, 552) = 29.51, and these effects were qualified 
by a significant interaction between expectancy and contingency, F(2, 552) = 3.345. 
Analysis of the simple effects of expectancy showed that the positive expectancy did not 
affect estimates when the contingency was negative, F(l , 552) = .019, MSE = 0.20. 
However, estimates were significantly affected by the positive expectancy when the 
contingency was zero, F(l, 552) = 9.26, MSE = 0.20, and when it was positive, F( 1, 552) 
= 8.89, MSE = 0.20. Thus, estimates were higher for the zero and positive contingency 
when the expectancy was positive than when there was no expectancy. 
When the expectancy was negative, the main effect of expectancy was not 
significant, F( 1, 552) = 1.285, MSE = 0.20, but there was a significant main effect of 
contingency, F(2, 552) = 19.71, and a marginally significant interaction between 
expectancy and contingency, F(2, 552) = 2.53, p <0.10. Analysis of the simple effects of 
expectancy for each contingency indicated that the negative expectancy affected young 
adults' estimates when the contingency was negative, F( 1, 552) = 4.545, MSE - 0.20, 
such that estimates were lower when the expectancy was negative than when the 
expectancy was unknown. Thus, estimates changed in the direction of the expectancy 
when the contingency confirmed the expectancy. Estimates were not affected by the 
negative expectancy when the contingency was zero, F(l , 552) = 1.03, MSE = 0.20, or 
when it was positive, F(l, 552) = 0.62, MSE = 0.20. 
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Finally, when the expectancy was unrelated, there was a main effect of 
expectancy, 552) = 4.28, MSE - 0.20, indicating that overall estimates were higher 
when the expectancy was unrelated than when it was unknown. There was also a 
significant main effect of contingency, F(3, 552) = 8.915, such that estimates were 
highest when the contingency was positive and lowest when the contingency was 
negative. The event pairs for the unrelated expectancy were perceived as more positive 
than the event pairs for the unknown expectancy, but because of the nature of the 
unrelated expectancy, this effect cannot be attributed to an expectancy effect. Only a 
significant interaction between expectancy and contingency would indicate an unrelated 
expectancy effect. Specifically, an effect of the unrelated expectancy would produce 
lower estimates when the contingency is positive and higher estimates when the 
contingency is negative. This effect did not occur, as the interaction between expectancy 
and contingency was not significant, F(2, 552) = .695. 
Young adults' estimates of contingency were significantly different when an 
expectancy existed than when there was no expectancy. Specifically, when the 
expectancy was positive, estimates were higher when the contingency confirmed the 
expectancy and were biased in direction of the expectancy when the contingency was 
zero, but were not affected by expectancy when the contingency was negative. When the 
expectancy was negative, estimates were lower when the contingency confirmed the 
expectancy, but estimates were not affected by expectancy when the contingency and the 
expectancy were incongruent. In general, estimates were higher when the expectancy 
was unrelated, but these effects cannot be attributed to the effect of expectancy because 
the interaction between expectancy and contingency was not significant. 
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For older adults, there were significant main effects of expectancy, F(3, 552) = 
30.26, MSE = .20, and contingency, F(2, 552) = 12.985; however, the interaction between 
expectancy and contingency was not significant, F(6, 552) = .429. Polynomial contrasts 
for the contingency effect revealed a significant linear trend of contingency such that 
estimates were lowest when the contingency was negative (M= -.003, SE - .055) and 
highest when the contingency was positive (M= .305, SE = .047). To explore the impact 
of expectancy on older adults' direct estimates of contingency, planned comparisons were 
conducted for each of the following expectancy combinations: positive vs. unknown, 
negative vs. unknown, unrelated vs. unknown. These analyses revealed that across 
contingency, estimates were significantly greater when the expectancy was positive (M= 
.551, SE = .046) than estimates when the expectancy was unknown (M= .129, SE = 
.059), F( 1, 552) = 31.53, MSE = .20. Estimates were significantly lower when the 
expectancy was negative (M= -.091, SE = .068) than estimates when the expectancy was 
unknown, F( 1, 552) = 8.105, MSE = .20. Estimates were not different when the 
expectancy was unrelated (M= 0.083, SE = .047) than estimates when the expectancy 
was unknown, F( 1, 552) = 0.341, MSE = .20. These results show that older adults 
exhibited an expectancy effect for both the positive and negative expectancies but not for 
the unrelated expectancy. Moreover, effects of expectancy were consistent across the 
three contingencies. 
To further explore the age differences in the effect of expectancy, I examined the 
simple interaction of age by expectancy for each contingency. When the contingency 
was negative, there were significant main effects of age, F(1, 552) = 17.45, MSE = .20, 
and expectancy, F{3, 552) = 10.595. However, these main effects were qualified by a 
significant interaction between age and expectancy, F(3, 552) = 6.33. Comparisons of 
the age effect for each expectancy showed that older adults' negative contingency 
estimates were significantly higher than young adults' estimates when the expectancy 
was positive, F( 1, 552) = 35.805, MSE = .20, and when it was negative, F( 1, 552) = 
5.525, MSE = .20, but their estimates were not different from young adults' estimates 
when the expectancy was unrelated, F( 1, 552) = .161, MSE = .20, or unknown, F(\ , 552) 
= 1.30, MSE = .20. Thus older adults' estimates were more biased by the positive 
expectancy than young adults' estimates and although their estimates showed a 
significant overall effect of the negative expectancy, they lacked the strong confirmation 
effect for the negative expectancy that young adults exhibited. 
When the contingency was zero, the main effect of age was not significant, F( 1, 
552) = 3.40, MSE = .20, but the main effect of expectancy was significant, F(3, 552) = 
11.75, as was the interaction between age and expectancy, F(3, 552) = 3.02. 
Comparisons of the age effect for each expectancy showed that older adults' estimates 
were again significantly higher than young adults' when the expectancy was positive, 
F( 1, 552) = 5.955, MSE = .20, and when it was unknown, F(l , 552) = 5.35, MSE = .20, 
but their estimates were not different from young adults when the expectancy was 
negative, F(l, 552) = 1.485, MSE = .20, or unrelated, F( 1, 552) = .068, MSE = .20. 
Therefore, older adults showed a greater positive expectancy bias than young adults, and 
their estimates were generally greater than young adults' estimates when the expectancy 
was unknown. 
Finally, when the contingency was positive, neither the main effect of age, F( 1, 
552) = .022, MSE = .20, nor the interaction between age and expectancy, F(3, 552) = 
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.249, r\2 = .004, was significant. However, the main effect of expectancy was significant, 
F(3, 552) = 14.04. To explore the impact of expectancy on young and older adults' direct 
estimates when the contingency was positive, planned comparisons were conducted for 
each of the following expectancy combinations: positive vs. unknown, negative vs. 
unknown, and unrelated vs. unknown. These analyses revealed that across age and 
contingency, estimates were significantly greater when the expectancy was positive, F(\, 
552) = 18.785, MSE = .20, than estimates when the expectancy was unknown, but 
estimates were not different when the expectancy was negative, F( 1, 552) = 2.045, MSE 
= .20, or unrelated, F(l, 552) = 0.035, MSE = .20, from estimates when the expectancy 
was unknown. Young and older adults showed similar expectancy effects, such that 
estimates for the positive contingency were higher when the expectancy was positive. 
Neither young or older adults showed an expectancy effect when the expectancies were 
negative or unrelated. 
Overall, older adults' direct estimates of contingency were more affected by the 
positive expectancy than young adults because their estimates were greater across 
contingency. However when the expectancy was negative, both young and older adults' 
estimates showed a similar effect of expectancy, such that estimates were lower when the 
expectancy was negative than estimates when the expectancy was unknown. Young 
adults showed a marginally greater confirmation effect than older adults when the 
negative expectancy and the negative contingency matched. Regardless of contingency, 
young and older adults' estimates were not different when the expectancy was unrelated. 
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Table 4. 
Mean Confidence Ratings for Direct Estimates of Contingency 
Expectancy Young Adults Older Adults 
Positive 6.904 (.204) 7.420 (.230) 
Negative 6.474 (.239) 7.007 (.262) 
Unrelated 6.040 (.267) 6.670 (.364) 
Unknown 5.775 (.267) 5.450 (.387) 
*Note. Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors. 
A 2(Age) x 4(Expectancy) x 3 (Contingency) factorial ANOVA was conducted for 
the confidence ratings for the direct contingency estimates. The main effects of age, F(l, 
552) =2.748, MSE = 5.360, r|2 = .005, and contingency, F(2, 552) = .382, r\2 = .001, were 
not significant, indicating that estimates did not vary across age or contingency. 
However, as in the baseline confidence ratings, there was a significant main effect of 
expectancy, F(3, 552) = 11.657, T)2 = .060, and post hoc analyses revealed that when the 
expectancy was positive, confidence ratings were significantly higher than ratings when 
the expectancy was unrelated, or unknown, but were similar to ratings when the 
expectancy was negative; ratings were also significantly higher when the expectancy was 
negative than when it was unknown, but were not different from ratings when the 
expectancy was unrelated; and finally, ratings were higher when the expectancy was 
unrelated than when it was unknown (Tukey's HSD, p < .05). Interactions between age 
and expectancy, F(3, 552) = 1.118, r|2 = .006, age and contingency, F(2, 552) = .009, i f 
= .00, expectancy and contingency, F(6, 552) = 2.001, T)2 = .021, and age, expectancy, 
and contingency, F(6, 552) = .921, r|2 = .010, were not significant. Overall, people were 
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again more confident of their estimates when they had an expectancy than when they did 
not. These confidence ratings therefore resemble the baseline confidence ratings with the 
exception that older adults' ratings were no longer greater than those of young adults. 
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Figure 2. Mean estimates of contingency for young and older adults for each contingency 
and expectancy. Note that the actual contingency was -0.50, 0.00, or +0.50. 
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Derived Estimates of Contingency 
For each contingency problem, participants reported frequency estimates of the 
event pair combinations in the 2 x 2 contingency table. These frequency estimates were 
then used to compute conditional probabilities based on the following formula: P(0/C)= 
C0/(C0+C~0) and P(0/~C)=~C0/(~C0+~C~0). The derived estimate of contingency 
was the difference between these two conditional probabilities [AP = P(0/C) - P(0/~C)]. 
These data can be seen in Figure 3. 
A 2(Age) x 4(Expectancy) x 3 (Contingency) factorial ANOVA was conducted for 
the derived estimates of contingency. The main effect of age was not significant, F(l , 
550) = .125, MSE = .052, T|2 = .00; however, there was a significant main effect of 
expectancy, F(3, 550) = 9.558, r|2 = .050, indicating that estimates were affected by 
expectancy, as well as a significant main effect of contingency, F(2, 550) = 214.417, r\ = 
.438, indicating that estimates varied by contingency. The interaction between 
expectancy and contingency was not significant, F(6, 550) = .1.724, T|2 = .018, but there 
was a significant interaction between age and expectancy, F(3, 550) = 7.660, T| = .042, 
as well as a significant interaction between age and contingency, F(2, 550) = 31.863, 
MSE = .052. The three-way interaction of age, expectancy, and contingency was not 
significant, F(6, 550) = .830. 
To explore the two-way interaction between age and contingency, analyses of the 
simple effects of contingency were conducted for young and older adults. For young 
adults, there was an effect of contingency, F(2, 550) = 216.885, MSE = .052, and 
polynomial contrasts revealed that there was a significant linear trend of contingency. 
Specifically, young adults' estimates were lowest when the contingency was negative 
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(M= -.290, SE = .024), close to zero when the contingency was zero (M= -.003, SE = 
.024), and highest when the contingency was positive (M= .379,SE= .023). Likewise, 
there was an effect of contingency for older adults, F(2, 550) = 42.73, MSE = .052, and 
polynomial contrast revealed that there was a significant linear trend of contingency. 
Specifically, older adults' estimates were lowest when the contingency was negative (M 
= -.120, SE = .023), close to zero when the contingency was zero (M= .045, SE = .024), 
and highest when the contingency was positive (M= .181, SE = .023). However, the 
slope of the linear trend for young adults (.R'2 = 0.598) was steeper than the older adults' 
slope (R2 = 0.212), showing that young adults derived estimates of contingency were 
more accurate. 
To explore the interaction between age and expectancy, simple effects of 
expectancy were examined for young and older adults. For young adults, there was a 
significant effect of expectancy, F(3, 550) = 6.269, MSE = .052, indicating that young 
adults' estimates were affected by expectancy. To determine where this expectancy 
effect had occurred, planned comparisons comparing expectancy conditions (positive, 
negative, unrelated) with the unknown expectancy condition were conducted. These 
analyses revealed that expectancy did not affect the young adults' estimates when the 
expectancy was positive, F(l , 550) = .027, MSE = .052, or when it was negative, F(l, 
550) = .528, MSE = .052. However, when the expectancy was unrelated, young adults' 
estimates were affected by expectancy, F(l , 550) = 9.50, MSE - .052, such that estimates 
were greater when the expectancy was unrelated than estimates when the expectancy was 
unknown. Again, this effect cannot be attributed to the unrelated expectancy because the 
interaction between expectancy and contingency was not significant. As seen in the 
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young adults' direct estimates, the derived estimates were significantly higher when the 
expectancy was unrelated than when there was no expectancy. 
For older adults, there was a significant effect of expectancy, F(3, 550) = 12.577, 
MSE = .052, indicating that older adults' estimates were affected by expectancy. To 
determine where this expectancy effect occurred, planned comparisons of each 
expectancy condition (positive, negative, unrelated) with the unknown expectancy 
condition were conducted. These analyses revealed that expectancy did not affect the 
older adults' estimates when the expectancy was positive, F( 1, 550) = 1.43, MSE = .052, 
or unrelated, F( 1, 550) = 3.615, MSE = .052. However, older adults' estimates were 
affected by the negative expectancy, F( 1, 550) = 9.50, MSE = .052. Specifically, their 
estimates were significantly lower when the expectancy was negative (M= -.079, SE = 
.028) than when there was no expectancy (M= .085, SE — .038). 
The direct estimates of contingency were more sensitive to expectancy effects 
than derived estimates of contingency. In young adults' derived estimates of 
contingency, only the unrelated expectancy differed from the unknown expectancy. 
Again this finding is not an effect of the unrelated expectancy because the interaction 
between the unrelated expectancy and contingency was not significant. Therefore, young 
adults' derived estimates of contingency were not affected by expectancy, but their direct 
estimates of contingency were affected by the positive and negative expectancies. 
Likewise, the positive expectancy no longer affected older adults' estimates of derived 
contingency the way it had their direct estimates of contingency. However, the negative 
expectancy still affected both their direct and derived estimates of contingency. 
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Figure 3. Mean derived estimates of contingency for young and older adults for each 
contingency and expectancy. Note that the derived estimates of contingency were based 
on the participants' frequency estimates. 
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Chapter 5 
Discussion 
The purpose of the current study was to examine age differences in contingency 
judgment for all possible interactions between expectancy and current situational 
information proposed in the framework by Alloy and Tabachnik (1984). The most 
prominent age difference in judgment was expected to occur when both expectancy and 
current situational information were strong and incongruent. As in the illusory 
correlation study by Mutter and Pliske (1994), older adults were expected to bias their 
judgments in the direction of their expectancy and be less likely to revise this judgment 
when presented with incongruent situational information. However, no age-related 
differences were expected when the expectancy was strong but the current situational 
information was weak. Likewise, age-related differences were predicted to disappear 
when expectancy and situational information were both congruent, regardless of the 
strength of the two sources of information, and when the expectancy was weak but the 
current situational information was strong. In all conditions, young adults were expected 
to be more accurate in their judgments when compared to older adults (Mutter & Pliske, 
1996) 
Overall, older adults' estimates of contingency were not as accurate as young 
adults' estimates of contingency. Nearly all contingency estimates reflected an effect of 
expectancy, but not all expectancies affected contingency estimates the same way, nor 
did they affect young and older adults in the same way. For instance, young adults' 
direct estimates of contingency were affected by positive and negative expectancies, but 
these expectancy effects varied across contingency. Specifically, the positive expectancy 
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affected estimates only when the contingency was zero and positive, and the negative 
expectancy affected estimates only when the contingency was negative. Older adults' 
direct estimates of contingency were affected only by positive and negative expectancies, 
but these effects were evident across all of the contingencies. When directly compared, 
young and older adults' direct estimates of contingency were affected differently by 
expectancy when the expectancy was positive and the contingency was incongruent or 
did not match. Specifically, older adults' estimates showed a greater positive expectancy 
bias than did young adults' estimates. Likewise, young adults showed a marginally 
greater confirmation effect than did older adults when the negative expectancy and the 
negative contingency matched, such that young adults' estimates were lower than older 
adults' estimates. 
The results for young adults' direct estimates of contingency mirrored those of 
Billman et al. (1992), but my interpretation of these results is very different. Specifically, 
like Billman et al., I found significant effects of contingency and expectancy and a 
significant interaction between expectancy and contingency. However, Billman, et al. 
concluded that the unrelated expectancy had the greatest biasing effect on their young 
adults' direct estimates of contingency because these estimates were compressed towards 
zero thereby showing the least amount of contingency discrimination. However, in the 
case of positive and negative expectancies, estimates can be strongly affected by the 
expectancy but still show contingency discrimination. For example, a positive 
expectancy could inflate all estimates in the direction of the expectancy but still preserve 
differences among contingencies. Likewise, a negative expectancy could lower all 
estimates in the direction of the expectancy but still show differences among 
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contingencies. Comparing the estimates of contingency made under an expectancy with 
estimates of contingency made with no expectancy is a better assessment of the effects of 
expectancy. In particular, expectancy effects are indicated by higher estimates when the 
expectancy is positive compared to estimates when the expectancy is unknown, and 
lower estimates when the expectancy is negative compared to estimates when the 
expectancy is unknown. For the unrelated expectancy, an effect of expectancy would be 
indicated by a significant interaction between expectancy and contingency, such that 
estimates are lower when the contingency is positive and higher when the contingency is 
negative compared to estimates in the corresponding contingencies when the expectancy 
is unknown. 
Billman et al. did not report whether the estimates showed an effect of expectancy 
across contingency, nor did they perform any type of analyses to determine exactly where 
these effects occurred. Because their reported results are similar to mine, I suspect that 
expectancy effects also selectively affected certain contingencies based on the type of 
expectancy. Furthermore, they reported that their primary analysis was a repeated-
measures ANOVA of estimates of contingency with expectancy, actual contingency, and 
subjects as factors; however, based on their way recoding the baseline estimates, the 
number of participants and the reported degrees of freedom, it is highly unlikely that this 
analysis is the one they used. Due to these issues, it is difficult to determine whether the 
present results actually parallel those of Billman et al. However, their basic design 
served as a good model for investigating the effects of expectancy on contingency 
judgments. 
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In general, the results from my analyses paralleled the findings of other age 
related studies. As in prior studies showing that older adults are more likely to make 
social judgments consistent with their expectancies even after being presented with 
additional incongruent information (Hess & Follet, 1994; Hess & Pullen, 1994; Hess et 
al., 1987), the current study showed an effect of expectancy on older adults' judgments 
after being presented with incongruent expectancy information. Likewise, the current 
results replicated Mutter and Pliske's (1994) findings that older adults' contingency 
estimates showed a greater expectancy effect than young adults' estimates for positive 
expectancies. The current study extended these findings by adding negative and unrelated 
expectancies and found that young adults' estimates showed a greater confirmation effect 
than older adults' estimates when the expectancy was negative, but young and older 
adults' estimates were not different when the expectancy was unrelated. 
The overall goal of the current study was to examine all possible combinations of 
expectancy and current situational information proposed in Alloy and Tabachnik's (1984) 
interactional theoretical framework for contingency judgment. The main premise of 
Alloy and Tabachniks' theoretical framework is that judgments will be based on the 
interaction of the relative strength of expectancies and current information. Based on this 
framework, I originally predicted that the largest age differences would emerge when the 
expectancy and the contingency were both strong and incongruent and that older adults 
would show a greater expectancy bias than would young adults. However, this bias was 
the strongest when the expectancy was positive and the contingency was incongruent, 
and it occurred regardless of the strength of the contingency. Likewise, I predicted that 
there would be no age differences when the expectancy and the contingency were 
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congruent, but young adults showed a greater confirmation effect than did older adults 
when the expectancy was negative. The results may not have matched the predictions 
because Alloy and Tabachnik's framework assumes that all types of expectancies will 
affect judgments in the same way. The results of the current study suggest that this is not 
the case. Estimates of contingency were affected differently based on the type of 
expectancy, such that the positive expectancy produced the strongest biasing effect, 
especially for older adults; the negative expectancy produced the strongest confirmation 
effect, especially for young adults; and the unrelated expectancy did not appear to affect 
estimates of contingency, for young or older adults. However, it is also important to note 
that the effects of expectancy on contingency estimates may have been underrepresented 
for the negative expectancy because this expectancy was not as strong as the positive 
expectancy. Therefore, future research is needed to determine if Alloy and Tabachnik's 
framework would have held true had the general negative expectancy been stronger. 
In addition, the effects of expectancy varied for direct and derived estimates of 
contingency, and these effects were not consistent across age. Trailer and Hamilton 
(1986) concluded that direct and derived estimates of contingency were functionally 
equivalent measures of assessing contingency detection. However, in the current study, 
the patterns of results for the direct estimates of contingency suggest that this is not the 
case. In particular, the direct estimates of contingency were more sensitive to expectancy 
effects. For example, the young adults' direct estimates of contingency reflected several 
expectancy effects. In contrast, their derived estimates of contingency were affected only 
by unrelated expectancy and as explained previously this outcome was not a true effect of 
expectancy. Likewise, older adults' derived estimates of contingency appeared to be 
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affected only when the expectancy was negative, unlike their direct estimates, which 
showed an expectancy effect for both positive and negative expectancies. 
Of greater interest, were the age differences in the accuracy of direct and derived 
estimates of contingency. Even though both young and older adults' direct and derived 
estimates showed a significant linear trend of contingency, young adults' derived 
estimates more accurately reflected the actual contingencies. In contrast, the accuracy of 
older adults' direct and derived estimates did not differ. These age differences for direct 
and derived estimates of contingency may be due to the fact that the derived estimates of 
contingency were based on recall of frequency information. Recalling frequency 
information requires less cognitive effort than recalling frequency information and 
integrating this information to give a direct estimate of contingency. Young adults' 
derived estimates of contingency may have been more accurate than their direct estimates 
because they had little difficulty recalling the frequency information but had difficulty 
integrating this information into an estimate of contingency. Older adults appeared to 
have problems both recalling and integrating the frequency information. As several 
previous studies have pointed out, recalling and integrating frequency information that is 
expectancy incongruent becomes less efficient with age. Therefore, older adults' greater 
reliance on expectancies in judgment is likely to be due to diminished cognitive resources 
(Hess, 1994; Mutter, 2000; Mutter & Pliske, 1994, 1996). 
It should be noted that the conditions in this experiment were highly optimal for 
making contingency estimates. Participants were explicitly told to pay close attention to 
the information presented because they were going to be asked to make a direct estimate 
of contingency, and very little time passed between the statement presentation and the 
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judgment process. In contrast, in the "real-world," expectancies are developed and 
strengthened over a long period of time, conflicting information is infrequent and 
seldomly attended to, and people are rarely asked to quantify their judgments. Therefore, 
the expectancy biases exhibited in this experiment may have been smaller because 
judgments were made under optimal conditions. 
Conclusion 
Almost all judgments were affected by expectancy in some way. However, 
different expectancies did not affect judgment in the same way, nor did they affect young 
and older adults in the same manner. Only when the expectancy was positive and the 
contingency information was incongruent did older adults show a greater biasing effect of 
expectancy than young adults. Moreover, when the expectancy was negative, young 
adults showed a greater confirmation effect of expectancy than older adults. Future 
research is needed to explain why certain types of expectancies affect young and older 
adults' estimates of contingency differently. 
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Appendix A 
Contingency Tables 
Contingency -0.50. 
Data Set One (DS1) 
Outcome 
0 ~0 Total 
C 3 15 18 
Cue 
~C 4 2 6 
Data Set Two (DS2) 
Outcome 
0 ~0 Total 
C 1 5 6 
Cue 
~C 12 6 18 
Data Set Three (DS3) 
Outcome 
0 ~0 Total 
C 6 10 16 
Cue 
~C 7 1 8 
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Data Set Four (DS4) 
Outcome 
O ~0 Total 
C I 11 12 
Cue 
~C 7 5 12 
Contingency 0.00. 
Data Set One (DS1) 
Outcome 
0 ~0 Total 
C 6 12 18 
Cue 
~C 2 4 6 
Data Set Two (DS2) 
Outcome 
0 ~0 Total 
C 12 4 16 
Cue 
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Data Set Three (DS3) 
Outcome 
0 ~0 Total 
c 14 2 16 
Cue 
~C 7 1 8 
Data Set Four (DS4) 
Outcome 
0 ~0 Total 
C 6 6 12 
Cue 
~C 6 6 12 
Contingency 0.50. 
Data Set One (DS1) 
Outcome 
O ~0 Total 
C 4 2 6 
Cue 
~C 3 15 18 
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Data Set Three (DS3) 
Outcome 
0 ~0 Total 
c 7 1 8 
Cue 
~C 6 10 16 
Data Set Three (DS3) 
Outcome 
0 ~0 Total 
C 10 6 16 
Cue 
~C 1 7 8 
Data Set Four (DS4) 
Outcome 
0 ~0 Total 
C 11 1 12 
Cue 
-C 5 7 12 
Appendix B 
Counterbalancing Order Abbreviation Key 
Actual contingency (-0.50, 0.00, +0.50), contingency table data set, expectancy, 
and expectancy context were counterbalanced using a randomized Latin-square design to 
create 12 different problem orders. See Appendix B for detailed contingency table data 
set information. 
DS1-DS4: First through fourth contingency table data set for each actual contingency 
PI: First positive expectancy Caloric intake and body weight 
P2: Second positive expectancy Smoking cigarettes and lung cancer 
P3: Third positive expectancy Number of credit cards and amount of credit debt 
Nl: First negative expectancy Anger and compassion 
N2: Second negative expectancy Amount of television watched and number of books 
read 
N3: Third negative expectancy Church attendance and prison sentence 
UK1: First unknown expectancy Silicon content and rock density 
UK2: Second unknown expectancy Daily calcium intake and average resting pulse 
UK3: Third unknown expectancy Percent of body fat and red blood cell count 
UR1: First unrelated expectancy Number of movies attended and red meat 
consumption 
UR2: Second unrelated expectancy Finger length and sexual orientation 
UR3: Third unrelated expectancy Height and grade point average 
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Counterbalancing Order 
PI N1 UK1 UR1 N2 P2 UR2 UK2 UR3 P3 UK3 N3 
1 0.5 0.0 -0.5 0.5 0.5 0.0 -0.5 0.0 0.0 -0.5 0.5 -0.5 
DS1 DS1 DS1 DS2 DS3 DS2 DS2 DS3 DS4 DS3 DS4 DS4 
2 0.0 -0.5 0.5 -0.5 0.0 -0.5 0.5 -0.5 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.5 
DS1 DS1 DS1 DS2 DS2 DS3 DS2 DS4 DS3 DS3 DS4 DS4 
3 -0.5 0.5 0.0 0.0 -0.5 0.5 -0.5 0.5 0.5 0.0 -0.5 0.0 
DS1 DS1 DS1 DS2 DS2 DS2 DS3 DS3 DS4 DS3 DS4 DS4 
UK1 PI UR1 N1 P2 UK2 N2 UR2 N3 UK3 UR3 P3 
4 0.5 0.0 -0.5 0.5 0.5 0.0 -0.5 0.0 0.0 -0.5 0.5 -0.5 
DS2 DS2 DS2 DS3 DS4 DS3 DS3 DS4 DS1 DS4 DS1 DS1 
5 0.0 -0.5 0.5 -0.5 0.0 -0.5 0.5 -0.5 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.5 
DS2 DS2 DS2 DS3 DS3 DS4 DS3 DS1 DS4 DS4 DS1 DS1 
6 -0.5 0.5 0.0 0.0 -0.5 0.5 -0.5 0.5 0.5 0.0 -0.5 0.0 
DS2 DS2 DS2 DS3 DS3 DS3 DS4 DS4 DS1 DS4 DS1 DS1 
N1 UR1 PI UK1 UR2 N2 UK2 P2 UK3 N3 P3 UR3 
7 .5 0.0 -0.5 0.5 0.5 0.0 -0.5 0.0 0.0 -0.5 0.5 -0.5 
DS3 DS3 DS3 DS4 DS1 DS4 DS4 DS1 DS2 DS1 DS2 DS2 
8 0.0 -0.5 0.5 -0.5 0.0 -0.5 0.5 -0.5 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.5 
DS3 DS3 DS3 DS4 DS4 DS1 DS4 DS2 DS1 DS1 DS2 DS2 
9 -0.5 0.5 0.0 0.0 -0.5 0.5 -0.5 0.5 0.5 0.0 -0.5 0.0 
DS3 DS3 DS3 DS4 DS4 DS4 DS1 DS1 DS2 DS1 DS2 DS2 
UR1 UK1 N1 PI UK2 UR2 P2 N2 P3 LR3 N3 UK3 
10 0.5 0.0 -0.5 0.5 0.5 0.0 -0.5 0.0 0.0 -0.5 0.5 -0.5 
DS4 DS4 DS4 DS1 DS2 DS1 DS1 DS2 DS3 DS2 DS3 DS3 
11 0.0 -0.5 0.5 -0.5 0.0 -0.5 0.5 -0.5 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.5 
DS4 DS4 DS4 DS1 DS1 DS2 DS1 DS3 DS2 DS2 DS3 DS3 
12 -0.5 0.5 0.0 0.0 -0.5 0.5 -0.5 0.5 0.5 0.0 -0.5 0.0 
DS4 DS4 DS4 DS1 DS1 DS1 DS2 DS2 DS3 DS2 DS3 DS3 
Appendix A 
General Instructions 
For this part of the session, we will be asking you to make judgments about the 
contingency or relationship between two events. When there is a relationship between 
two events, the strength of the relationship might be perfect, strong, or weak. The 
relationship is PERFECT when the first event always predicts the second event. The 
relationship is STRONG when the first event frequently predicts the second event. The 
relationship is WEAK when the first event occasionally predicts the second event. On 
the other hand , there may be no relationship between the two events at all. There is NO 
relationship when the first event does not predict the second event. 
The direction of a contingency relationship can be positive or negative. A 
contingency is POSITIVE when the second event occurs more often in the presence of 
the first event than in its absence; a contingency is NEGATIVE when the second event 
occurs more often in the absence of the first event than in its presence. 
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Here are some examples of contingency relationships of various strengths and directions: 
-100 Perfect negative contingency; e.g., The degree to which total darkness 
prevents sight. 
-70 Strong negative contingency: e.g., The degree to which helmets prevent 
serious head injuries. 
-30 Weak negative contingency: e.g., The degree to which exercise prevents 
heart disease. 
0 No relationship: e.g., The degree to which a day of rain causes the stock 
market to rise. 
+30 Weak positive contingency: e.g., The degree to which getting wet causes a 
cold. 
+70 Strong positive contingency: e.g., The degree to which being exposed to a 
virus causes the flu. 
+100 Perfect positive contingency: e.g., The degree to which rain causes the 
ground to be wet. 
You will be given 12 different problem scenarios in which you will be asked to 
estimate the strength and the direction of the contingency relationship between two 
events. For each scenario, you will first be asked to make an estimate based on your 
current beliefs about the relationship between the two events. You will then see a set of 
cases that provide new information or data about the relationship between the events and 
you will be asked to estimate the contingency relationship based on this information. Do 
you have any questions about the general procedure for this task? 
Appendix A 
Example of Specific Instructions 
Smoking and Lung Cancer 
The Surgeon General of the United States has stated that smoking may be harmful to a 
person's health. For many years medical researchers have studied whether smoking 
cigarettes is related to lung cancer. It may be the case that smoking is related to lung 
cancer; i.e., smoking predicts lung cancer. Alternatively, it may be the case that smoking is 
unrelated to lung cancer; i.e., smoking does not predict lung cancer. 
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Using the scale below, indicate your estimate of the strength of the 
relationship between smoking and lung cancer. 
Note that the scale ranges from 0 to 100. The value 0 indicates that a relationship does 
not exist. In other words, smoking does not predict lung cancer. The value 100 indicates 
that a perfect relationship exist. In other words, smoking perfectly predicts lung cancer. 
Scores between 0 and 100 indicate different degrees of strength for the relationship. To 
make your estimate, place a slash mark ( | ) on the scale at the point you believe is most 
representative of the relationship between smoking and lung cancer. Then indicate the 
numerical value of your estimate in the blank. 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Numerical Value: 
If you think a relationship does exist between smoking and lung cancer 
(i.e., your rating is not 0), is the direction of the relationship positive or 
negative? Please check the appropriate direction. 
Note that the relationship would be positive if lung cancer tends to be present in smokers 
and the relationship would be negative if lung cancer tends to be absent in smokers. 
Positive Negative 
Using the scale below indicate how confident you are in your estimate. 
Note that the scale ranges from 1 to 10. The value of 1 indicates that you are not at all 
confident in your estimate. The value of 10 indicates that you are extremely confident in 
your estimate. Scores between 1 and 10 indicate different degrees of confidence in your 
estimate. To rate your confidence, place a slash mark ( | ) on the scale at the point you 
believe is most representative of your confidence in your estimate. Then indicate the 
numerical value of your rating in the blank. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Numerical Value: 
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Smoking and Lung Cancer 
You will now see new data on the relationship between smoking and lung cancer that was 
collected recently by medical researchers. The data will be presented on a series of screens. 
Each screen contains information about a different person. In each case, the person will be 
either a smoker or a non-smoker and either will have lung cancer or will not have lung 
cancer. Thus, four types of cases are possible: 
The person is a SMOKER and HAS lung cancer. 
The person is a SMOKER and DOES NOT HAVE lung cancer. 
The person is a NONSMOKER and HAS lung cancer. 
The person is a NONSMOKER and DOES NOT HAVE lung cancer. 
I would like you to carefully study the information on each slide. After you have seen all 
of the slides, you will be asked to use this information to estimate the relationship 
between smoking and lung cancer. 
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Smoking and Lung Cancer 
We would now like to know what you have learned about the relationship between 
smoking and lung cancer from the data you have just observed. Using this information, 
answer the following questions to the best of your ability. 
Using the scale below, indicate your estimate of the strength of the 
relationship between smoking and lung cancer. 
Again, note that the scale ranges from 0 to 100. The value 0 indicates that a relationship 
does not exist, the value 100 indicates that a perfect relationship exists and scores 
between 0 and 100 indicate different degrees of strength for the relationship. To make 
your estimate, place a slash mark ( | ) on the scale at the point you believe is most 
representative of the relationship between smoking and lung cancer. Then indicate the 
numerical value of your estimate in the blank. 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Numerical Value: 
If you think a relationship does exist between smoking and lung cancer 
(i.e., your rating is not 0), is the direction of the relationship positive or 
negative? Please check the appropriate direction. 
Again, note that the relationship would be positive if lung cancer tends to be present in 
smokers and the relationship would be negative if lung cancer tends to be absent in 
smokers. 
Positive Negative 
Using the scale below indicate how confident you are in your estimate. 
Note that the scale ranges from 1 to 10. The value of 1 indicates that you are not at all 
confident in your estimate. The value of 10 indicates that you are extremely confident in 
your estimate. Scores between 1 and 10 indicate different degrees of confidence in your 
estimate. To rate your confidence, place a slash mark ( | ) on the scale at the point you 
believe is most representative of your confidence in your estimate. Then indicate the 
numerical value of your rating in the blank. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Numerical Value: 
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Based on the twenty-four cases you just observed, estimate the number of cases in 
which the person was a: 
a SMOKER and HAD lung cancer: 
a SMOKER and DID NOT HAVE lung cancer: 
a NONSMOKER and HAD lung cancer: 
a NONSMOKER and DID NOT HAVE lung cancer: 
Your estimates must total to: 24 Cases 
